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One of the most important statutes enacted in the 1949 session of
the Washington legislature is Chapter 112 of the 1949 Session Laws,
which, with its complement, Chapter 107, forms the new Fisheries
Code of the state, replacing the old provisions which had been in effect
with variations since x915. 1 The new Code is singular, not only in the
very broad administrative powers given to the Director of Fisheries,'
an office created by the Act, but also by virtue of the fact that certain
of its licensing provisions were inserted in apparent defiance of three
recent United States Supreme Court decisions,' raising certain doubts
as to the constitutionality of such provisions. It is proposed to test in
this comment Sections 63, 67, and 69 of that Code in the light of these
decisions. The problems presented divide themselves into two natural
divisions: (I) the validity of the licensing requirements of the new
Code as applied to resident aliens, and (2) the validity of the licensing
requirements of the new Code as applied to nonresidents of the state
of Washington. They will be discussed in that order.
THE VALIDITY OF THE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS OF
THE CODE AS APPLIED TO ALIENS
Section 63 of the new Code provides, in part, "No license provided
for in this act shall be issued to any person who is not a citizen of the
United States, or who has not in good faith declared his intentions of
becoming a citizen of the United States. "' This prohibition of the
1 REM. REV. STAT. §§ 5655-5780 [P.P.C. §§ 541 et seq.].
2 The director, to cite a few examples, is given complete control over the hiring,
management, and discharge of all department personnel, subject to the rules and regula-
tions of the State Personnel Board as established in Wash. Laws 1945, c.35 § 42, in
§ 6 he is given power to promulgate rules and regulations for the taking of fish,
(§ 7) , to search without warrant any place which handles fish if it is not used exclu-
sively as a private domicil, where he has reason to believe that food fish or shellfish
are being kept or handled, where he has reason to believe that there is evidence of
violation of the Code or any rule promulgated by the Department (§ 19).
• Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. 257 (1948), Takahashi
v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 1478 (1948)
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948).
4 It may be that the writer is partaking of a somewhat extralegal activity in quoting
these provisions of the new Code, for among the broad powers given the Director is the
following, contained in § 16, "No person shall print or cause to be printed a booklet
or pamphlet of the fisheries laws or regulations of the director or portions thereof
without the approval of the director."
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licensing of nondeclarant aliens is not new to the Washington Fish-
eries Law It had its origin in the Session Laws of 1907 and has been
carried down in successive codes since that time.' The construction of
this provision, or its variations, has been in issue m a few cases,' and
its validity was upheld against direct attack m the case of Lubetich v.
PollockT 11 1925.
That an alien is protected by the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is now well recognized under
the rule of Truax v. Rasc, s which is that an alien may not be pro-
hibited from earning a living in the common callings of life. Since the
Truax case, the only discrinunations by a state against aliens in cases
involving the comnon callings to be upheld are those concerned with
matters in which the state has a "proprietary interest" or over which
it exercises a sort of "state ownership." Thus the Alien Land Laws
were upheld in a series of cases in 1923,1 among which was the Wash-
ington case of Terrace v. Thompson,"0 on the theory that the state,
as ultimate owner of the land, has an interest in protecting its citi-
zens in the exclusive use of that land. Laws prohibiting the employ-
ment of aliens on public works have been upheld on much the same
theory,'1 and a law prohibiting an alien from practicing law was sus-
tamed on the theory that an attorney is an "officer of the court," which
is a state office that can be reserved to state citizens.12
This "proprietary interest" doctrine is usually relied upon by states
in seeking to preserve to their own citizens the use of fish and game
and tideland resources. The doctrine as applied to the particular
problem in hand is briefly this: that the state owns all the fish within
its inland waters and within three miles of its coast as a trustee for
all its citizens, and has power, as such trustee, to exclude any other
group it desires, including aliens, who have, according to the theory,
5 Wash. Laws 1907, c. 247 § 1, R~m. Rxv. STAT. § 5711 [P.P.C. § 545-26].
a State ex rel. Lacos v. Maybury, 136 Wash. 210, 239 Pac. 552 (1925), State v.
Tomich, 143 Wash. 364, 255 Pac. 122 (1927), State v. Nelson, 146 Wash. 17 261 Pac.
796 (1927).
7 6 F 2d 237 (W D. Wash. 1925).
8 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915). cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).
0 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255 (1923), Porterfield
v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 44 S.Ct. 21, 68 L.Ed. 278 (1923), Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S.
313, 44 S.Ct. 112, 68 L.Ed. 318 (1923), Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 44 S.Ct. 115,
68 L.Ed. 323 (1923).
10 Note 9, supra.
"'Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 36 S.Ct. 78, 60 L.Ed. 206 (1915), People v. Crane,
214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915), aff'd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
12 Re Admission to Bar, 61 Neb. 58, 84 N.W 611 (1900), cf. In re Yamashita,
30 Wash. 234, 70 Pac. 482, 59 L.R.A. 671 (1902).
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no community interest in the fish. The doctrine was first announced
and followed in the lower federal court case of Corfield v. Coryell" in
1823, and reached its full fruition as a United States Supreme Court
holding in McCready v. Virginia in 1877 '" In recent years however,
though the doctrine may still be sound as to the rights of a state as
proprietor over public works,"8 it has undergone considerable modifi-
cation and criticism as regards the state's interest in its fish and wild
game, 8 and in its tideland resources generally "
In keeping with this trend, the cases of Takahashz v. Fish & Game
Commissiwn," and Oyama v. Califormn a" have placed in doubt not
only statutes which bar aliens from certain occupations, but also the
Alien Land Laws which were so carefully distinguished from the
Truax rule by the court in Terrace v. Thompson. The Takahashi case
involved a Japanese-born resident of California who was ineligible
for citizenship under federal naturalization laws."° Takahashi sought
a writ of mandamus to compel the fish and game commissioner of
California to issue him a commercial fishing license, which the com-
missioner refused to do because of a California statute"' which pro-
hibited the issuing of such a license to "any person ineligible to citizen-
ship." On appeal to the United States Supreme Court it was held that
the statute was repugnant to the "equal protection" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court relying largely on Truax v. Rawh.
The Oyama case involved the California Alien Land Law,2" which
provided that no person ineligible to citizenship could own or lease
agricultural land, and that the taking of title to land in a minor
citizen, when the consideration was paid by an adult alien, was pre-
sumptive evidence of an attempt to evade the law The statute pro-
vided for escheat proceedings by the state as penalty for any infraction
or any attempted evasion of the law Kajiro Oyama, an ineligible alien,
paid for two pieces of agricultural land and had the deeds executed to
1 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
14 94 U.S. 391, 24 L.Ed. 248 (1877).
15 Note 11, supra.
Is Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984,
(1920) , Toomer v. Witsell, note 3, supra, and the discussion of that case, infra.
17 United States v. California, 232 U.S. 19, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947).
18 Note 3, supra.
10 Note 3, supra.
20 1 STAT. 103 (1790), 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1946), 16 STAT. 254, 256 (1870), 8 U.S.C.
§ 703 (1946) , 54 STAT. 1137, 1140 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1946), 57 STAT. 600, 601(1943), 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1946), 60 STAT. 416, 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1946), which leave
alien Japanese as one of the few remaining groups not eligible to citizenship.
21 Cal. Stats. 1945, p. 660.
22 CAL. GEa. LAWs, Act 261.
COMMENTS
Is American-born son. The state of California began escheat proceed-
ings, claiming this was presumptively an attempt to evade the law,
which contention the Supreme Court of California upheld.2" On certi-
orari to the United States Supreme Court the decision was reversed
on the narrow ground that the application of the presumption deprived
the citizen son of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court m the Takahasht case did not depart entirely from the
"proprietary interest" doctrine, though it was quick to recognize its
recent limitations. The holding of the case on this point is summed
up in the words of Justice Black, who delivered the opinion. "To
whatever extent the fish in the three-mile belt off California may be
'capable of ownership' by California, we think that 'ownership' is lii-
adequate to justify California in excluding any or all aliens who are
lawful residents of the State from making a living by fishing in the
ocean off its shores while permitting others to do so." But it is to be
noticed that the court m the case of Toomer v. Witsell,2 which was
handed down the same day as the 'Takahasht case and which will bq
discussed more fully later, described that doctrine as "but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a
state have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an im-
portant resource." These two cases taken together have almost entirely
destroyed the "state ownership" doctrine as applied to fish in the three-
mile belt.
The Oyama case offers no help on that problem directly, but it is
important to a discussion of the problem because-of the light it sheds
upon the attitude of the Supreme Court toward discrimnation against
aliens. Although the case was decided on the ground that the presump-
tion was invalid, four justices indicated in concurring opinions that
they would choose to declare unconstitutional the Alien Land Law
itself." The rest of the justices were so noncommittal upon that ques-
tion as to indicate that at least one of them nught be won over to
declaring the law itself invalid should the question ever come directly
before the court.
Applying these observations to the Washington Act, it would seem
that if the provision alluded to were ever contested before the United
States Supreme Court, it would certainly be stricken down. The court
2829 Cal.(2d) 164, 173 P.(2d) 794 (1946).
24 Notes 5 and 17, supra.25 Justices Black Douglas; Rutledge, and Murphy.
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in the Takahashi case has committed itself to a liberal application of
the rule of Truax v. Ratch, which is evidenced by the fact that the
court in the Truax case expressly excluded from its holding any mat-
ters over which the state had a proprietary interest. The Takahashi
decision, along with the attitude of the court reflected in the Oyama
case, and the weakening of the "proprietary interest" doctrine which
reached its culmination in Toomer v. Witsell, would seem to demon-
strate the invalidity of Section 63 of the new Washington Code.
There is a distinction between the Washington Code provision
against aliens and the California Act discussed in the Takahashi case,
which rmght save the Washington provision should it ever be contested.
The California exclusion has behind it a lurid history of racial bitter-
ness and antagonism directed against the Japanese, which, as legisla-
tive records show,2" led directly to the passage of the act. Indeed, two
concurring justices in the Takakashi case, Justices Murphy and Rut-
ledge, felt constrained to review this history in detail, and seemed
willing to conclude from this history that the act was prima facie in-
valid. Although Washington has not had this very strong sentiment,
there are indications that anti-alien feeling has crept into Washington
legislation. 7
Further there is the point that the decision in the Takahashi case
was limited to a consideration of the state's interest in the three-mile
marginal sea, and it might be seriously contended that the Washington
provision would be valid as to its inland waters. But in attempting to
make both of these distinctions, we are met again by the Truax rule,
the Oyama dictum, and a constantly weakenmg theory of state owner-
ship, which would make the validity of the Washington act, though
not primarily directed at a particular nationality and even as to inland
waters, very doubtful.
26 A 1943 amendment to § 990 of the CAL. FiSH AND GAME CODE provided that no
commercial fishing license should be issued to "alien Japanese." In 1945 this was
changed to read "a person ineligible to citizenship" on the basis of a report given to
the California legislature by their Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Japanese Re-
settlement. This report stated that the committee felt "that there is danger of the
present statute being declared unconsititutional, on the grounds of discrimination, since
it is directed at alien Japanese. It is believed that this legal question can probably be
eliminated by an amendment which has been proposed to the bill which would make it
apply to any alien who is ineligible to citizenship. The committee has introduced Senate
Bill 413 to make this change in the statute."
27 Note 7, supra. 24 WAsH. L. REv. 162 (1949). Also notice House Joint Memorial
No. 2, Wash. Laws 1911 p. 666, resolving, "that the Congress of the United States be
requested to pass such restrictive legislation as will put a stop to this enormous influx
of the most undesirable foreigners (southern and eastern Europeans and Western
Asiatics) whose presence tends to destroy American standards of living."
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THE VALIDITY OF THE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS OF THE
CODE AS APPLIED TO OUT-OF-STATE RESIDENTS
On the reasoning of the "state ownership" doctrine it was formerly
held that a state could prohibit any taking of its fish or game by citi-
zens of other states .2 With the partial abandonment of the doctrine
however, and with a more liberal interpretation being given the Four-
teenth Amendment, the validity of state statutes seeking to effect this
result, or to impose heavier burdens on out-of-state fishermen, seems
highly doubtful. In the more recent cases, whenever the statute is
found not to be a bona fide conservation measure, it has been stricken
down on one theory or another, largely upon the commerce and equal
protection clauses. 9
The latest and most important case on the problem is Toomer v.
Witsell, supra, which was decided in June of 1948. That case involved
a statute of South Carolina which imposed a license fee of $25 upon
the shrimp-fishing boats of South Carolina residents, and $2,500 upon
the boats of out-of-state shrimp fishermen who fished in South Caro-
lina waters." It further provided that all shrimp caught in the three-
mile South Carolina marginal sea should be landed at a South Carolina
port, unloaded, packed, and stamped before shipment into another
state. This latter provision was apparently inserted to insure to the
state the collection of a one-eighth cent per pound tax levied on all
green shrimp taken in the maritime belt.8' The shrimp sought to be
"protected" by the South Carolina statute are largely of a nugratory
type, swimming south toward Florida in the late summer and return-
Ing to the Carolinas in the spring. It was the desire of the fishermen
of that coastal region to follow the shrimp according to the season,
which was made financially impossible for most of them not residing
in South Carolina by the statute of that state. Accordingly, suit in
equity was brought against certain South Carolina officials by five
Georgia fishermen individually to enjoin them from enforcing the
statute on the ground that it was a violation of the privileges and
immunities clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, and the "equal
protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court,
28 Corfield v. Coryell, note 13, supra; McCready v. Virginia, note 14, jupra.
20 Foster-Fountain Pacang Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 1, 73 L.Ed. 147
(1928), Pavel v. Pattison, 24 F Supp. 915 (W.D. La. 1938), Pavel v. Richard, 28 F
Supp. 992 (W.D. La. 1938), Van Camp v. Dept. Natural Resources, 30 F.(2d) 111
(S.D. Cal. 1929).
20 S.C. ConE, § 3379 (1942), as amended by AcT 281 § 1, (Supp. 1947).
01 S.C. CODE, § 3414 (1942).
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through Chief Justice Vinson, upheld the plaintiffs' first contention.
stating that the discrimination was a violation of Art. IV, Sec. 2. The
commerce clause was relied upon by the court in invalidating that
section of the South Carolina law which required the shrimp to be
landed in South Carolina ports. As previously mentioned, the court
was not impressed with the "state ownership" argument, and it indi-
cated at the end of its consideration of the problem that whatever
the extent of that doctrine is, it is subject to the privileges and im-
munities clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2.
Less than a year after the rendering of the Toomer decision, the
Washington State legislature passed the new Fisheries Code, which
contains provisions which differ from those in the South Carolina Act
only in degree. The Washington Code is broader in scope than the
South Carolina Code referred to, in that it includes all types of fishing,
rather than a particular type. But, like the South Carolina Code, it
has a taxing provision for all fish landed in the state, 2 and imposes
higher license fees upon nonresidents than upon Washington resi-
dents. 3 These discriminatory fees are contained in Sections 67 and 69
of the Code. Section 67 requires every fishing guide to be licensed.
The fee: $io for residents, $50 for nonresidents. Section 69 provides
for resident license fees for each particular article of fishing equip-
ment used, ranging from $5 to $5o, but in every case, save for purse
seines and lampara or round haul nets, the license fee for nonresidents
is set at a figure exactly five times as high as that required of the local
fishermen.
There is some evidence that these provisions were not inserted into
the new Code in ignorance of the decision in Toomer v. Witsell. When
the law was originally introduced as Senate Bill 216, it contained a
provision, similar to that invalidated in the Toomer case, to the effect
that all fish should be landed in Washington ports. The purpose of
this provision, too, was apparently to guarantee to the state the collec-
tion of the "catch" fees prescribed in Chapter 107 of the 1949 Session
Laws. Somewhere in the devious legislative channels this provision was
deleted from the bill, and it may not be overly rash to suggest that this
was done with an eye to the Toomer case. Assunung this to be the
reason, why were the discriminatory license charges retained?
The most obvious answer to this question is that it was probably
contemplated that since the charge for nonresidents was not so patently
32 Wash Laws 1949, c. 107
$ Wash Laws 1949, c. 112 §§ 67, 69.
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discriminatory or prohibitive as it was in the Toomer situation, it
would be upheld. It is to be remembered in this connection that there
is nothing to prevent a state from discriminating against citizens of
other states where valid and independent reasons exist therefor."' The
inquiry as to the validity of any discriminatory statute, therefore, will
resolve itself into a consideration of these reasons and the degree of
correlation between them and the discrimination sought to be intro-
duced by the statute. Thus one student writer has suggested that where
such increased license fees for nonresidents will only result in their
contributing their share of the cost to the state in the regulation or
propagation of the resource involved, the discrminatory fees should
be upheld,"5 and the cases seem to bear this out."0 This argument would
apply, of course, only where such cost was borne by the state's general
fund, and not in situations where the cost of such regulation or propa-
gation was paid for directly out of the funds derived as license fees or
taxes in the particular enterprise."
In tins consideration lies the only hope for the continued validity
of the discriminatory provisions. The "privilege" fees which Chapter
107 provides shall be paid by those engaged in the fishing industry in
tins state are levied upon all canners, curers, freezers, wholesale fish
dealers, retail fish dealers, or fish by-products manufacturers of food
fish or shellfish who deal with the fish as "original receivers,"88 mean-
mg by the latter term the "person first receiving, handling, dealing in,
or dealing with the fresh or frozen food fish or shellfish within the
State of Washington.""9 The "catch" fees are to be paid by the person
taking the fish from the waters," and these fees are to be collected by
having the "original receiver" deduct them from the total price he
pays the fisherman for his fish, and remit them, along with Ins own
"privilege" fees to the Director of Fisheries to be paid into the general
fund." Remembering that the requirement originally contained in
Section xg of Senate Bill 216, that all fish be landed in this state, was
not enacted into law, it will be seen that out-of-state processors and
34 Hess v. Pawlosla, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927), Wisconsin
v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 61 S.Ct. 246, 85 L.Ed. 267 (1940).
85 Note, 47 MicHr. L. R. 113 (1948).
36 Bourjois v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 691, 81 L.Ed. 1027 (1937), note 34,
supra.
37 By § 25 of the new Code, all moneys collected as license fees are to be paid into
the general fund.
8sWash. Laws 1949 c. 107 § 1 (1), (2).39 Wash. Laws 1949 c. 107 § 1 (5).
40 Id.
41 Id., Wash Laws 1949 c. 112 § 25.
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fishermen have a distinct advantage over those within the state. The
processors, being without the state, will not have to pay the "privilege"
fees, and the nonresident fishermen will very likely not have to pay
the "catch" fees, for there is no method prescribed for the collection
of these fees other than by having the "original receiver" deduct them
from the price paid the fishermen. If the nonresident fishermen land
their fish in another state then they will be as a practical matter ex-
empt from the fees.
Why the deletion of Section ig from Senate Bill 216 was made is
conjectural, but its ultimate result is that it has provided a plausible
argument for the validity of the discriminatory license charges, for,
since the nonresident fishermen will now pay nothing into the general
fund save their license fees, it is only reasonable to require higher
license fees of them to match the contributions that resident fishermen
make to that fund by way of general state taxes, resident license fees,
and the "privilege" and "catch" fees. But it is to be borne in mind that
this entire argument is based on the supposition that what the non-
resident fishermen pay by way of increased license fees is not highly
in excess of that necessary to reimburse the state for the cost of the
added regulation and for the benefits derived by these nonresidents
from the state propagation of the fish.'2 Also it seems from a dictum
in the Toomer case that the burden would be on the state to show that
discriminatory fees were in fact just and reasonable."8
However, there are two classes of fishermen as to which the line of
argument advanced in support of the discriminatory fees would be
inapplicable. The first of these classes is comprised of those out-of-
state fishermen who choose to land their fish in this state. Since by
hypothesis the reason for the discriminatory license charges is that the
nonresident fishermen will not have to pay the "catch" fee, that reason
vanishes when the fishermen do in fact land their fish in this state, for
then they are subject to this fee, and would be making a double contri-
bution. The higher license charges would be, as to them, unreasonable
and of questionable validity
42 The statement of the court in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., not 36, supra, is
apropos. "The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything
for which it can ask return."
43 68 S.Ct. 1156, 1163 (1948). "In this connection appellees mention, without further
elucidation, the fishing methods used by nonresidents, the size of their boats, and the
allegedly greater cost of enforcing the laws against them. Nothing in the recordindicates that nonresidents use larger boats or different fishing methods than residents,
that the cost of enforcing the laws against them is appreciably greater, or that any sub-
stantial amount of the State's general funds is devoted to shrimp conservation."
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The second class as to which the argument would be inapplicable
is composed of those fishermen who, although resident in the state in
good faith, do not fulfill the definition of "resident" prescribed in the
Code. Section i provides that "a 'resident' shall be construed to mean
a person who for the preceding ninety (go) days has maintained a
permanent place of abode within the state with the intent to perma-
nently reside within the state." Thus under this definition a person
who moved into this state with a bona fide intention permanently to
reside here, but who had not resided here for the required ninety days,
could not receive a resident's license. The provision would be sufficient
to deprive him of such a license, in some cases, until the following
fishing season.
It was early held by the United States Supreme Court that any
citizen of the United States is entitled to become a citizen of any state
he chooses, providing he has the intent required to establish his doncil
there," and it would seem, therefore, that the attempted definition of
what shall constitute a resident would be invalid as to any person who
moved into this state with that intent. Certainly it is anomalous to
argue that although the person may be a citizen of the state under
these decisions of the Supreme Court, and although he may actually
be residing in the state, he is nevertheless not a resident for the purpose
of obtaining a commercial fishing license.
It is to be remembered also that the rule of the Toomer case was
limited to a discussion of free-swimnung shrimp in the marginal ea
and did not include the inland waters. Indeed, there were statutes
regulating shrimp-fishmg in the inland. South Carolina waters which
were not contested. Further, the court was particularly concerned with
the fact that the shrimp were migratory in character, placing the state's
claim to ownership on a shaky foundation. Thus it might be contended
that the Washington discriminatory license fees are valid as to non-
residents who fish in Puget Sound, or the upper waters of the Colum-
bia,"5 and other inland areas, and are also valid as to the more
stationary crustaceans. But if the Toomer case is read in context with
other decisions which have come down in recent years, it seems to be
a part of an expanding civil rights movement, and assuming this
44 Cassies-v. Ballon, 31 U.S. 761, 6 Pet. 761, 8 L.Ed. 573 (1832), Morris v. Gilmer,
129 U.S. 315, 9 S.Ct.,289, 32 L.Ed. 690 (1889), Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha
v. Bragg, 293 F 879 (C.C.A. 8th 1923). As to the necessity of the intent element,
Shelton v. Tiffin, 47 U.S. 163, 6 How. 163, 12 L.Ed. 387 (1848), Sharon v. Hill, 26 F
337 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885).
'- Washington and Oregon have concurrent jurisdiction over the lower waters of
the Columbia, and different rules apply.
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interpretation to be true, the rule of the Toomer case would probably
be extended to include the inland waters of a state and any type of
"fish."
CONCLUSION
In attempting to make any prediction as to the future of the sections
of the new Code tested in this comment, then, the following factors
should be kept in mind: (i) a growing tendency of the court to regard
as per se unreasonable any discrimination against aliens as such, (2) a
constantly weakening theory of "proprietary interest" or "state owner-
ship", (3) the tendency of the court to extend the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the privileges and immunities of Art. IV,
Sec. 2 to keep abreast of expanding civil rights concepts; and (4)
procedurally, the disposition of the court to place the burden of proof
upon the state enacting the discriminatory legislation of the type men-
tioned. Although, as suggested, there are arguments which might save
the provisions, they are largely based upon the antique "proprietary
interest" doctrine, and abound more with technicality than with justice
and reason. It is therefore to be expected that should these provisions
ever be contested before the Supreme Court, they will be held un-
constitutional.
